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A
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
R H A P S O D Y
ON THE
INVASION AND DEFENCE
OF
GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND.

ILLUSTRATED WITH THREE COPPER-PLATES.

BY THE LATE
GENERAL LLOYD.

TO WHICH IS ANNEXED,
AN INTRODUCTION, AND A SHORT AC-
COUNT OF THE AUTHOR'S LIFE.

Pro Arte & Focis.

CHARLES XII, AT BENDER.

L O N D O N :

SOLD BY T. AND J. EGERTON, CHARING-CROSS, AND
J. SEWELL, CORNHILL.

1762, &c.

Y. D. S. A. H. R.

INVASION AND DEFENCE

CREAT. BIRTH and DEATH.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

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GENERAL LINDO

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INTRO.

INTRODUCTION.

A PAMPHLET on the present armaments, and on the *Invasion of Great Britain*, was lately published in Paris, by a Mr. Dupont, some time since President of their National Assembly, and considered there as a patriotic writer and orator. In this conceited production, after accusing Great Britain of a variety of crimes, of her dreading, and wishing to overturn the new constitution of France, he exhorts, with national zeal and acrimony, his countrymen to support, and to strengthen the Family Compact: he boasts that France, Spain, and the United States of North America, whom he is pleased to enumerate with his allies, are an overmatch at sea for Great Britain and Holland. He anticipates the triumphs that would follow a national war, and lays it down as a preliminary that peace should not afterwards be restored, until the English Bank shall have become
a 3 bankrupt,

bankrupt, and all her naval arsenals shall be destroyed. He talks not a little vauntingly and superciliously of the exhausted credit and finances of Great Britain, and of the comparative superiority of riches in France, by means of the recent sequestered revenue and lands of the clergy. And he proposes schemes for the ruin of the British commerce, and the crippling of her navy.

Here follows, "verbatim" a specimen of Mr. Dupont's stile and modesty. "If the war be *short*, it shall be in the heart of your own country, and with all the impetuosity of the French nation. If it be *long*, the conquest shall be obtained by the last *Crown*. What is to prevent the inspection of the English Bank, by our national Grenadiers? Great Britain has yet no idea of a *national* war with France, of its activity, its obstinacy, its ferocity, and of the irresistible energy of the veteran warriors, and of the new warriors of France. We say not this *boastingly*; we ought to conquer you, as we are superior in number, and treasure. As soon as we have got together a sufficient force to protect our passage, *we will come over among* you. News from America, or from India, is naturally long coming. We
"are

"are, however, certain, that the power will be
 "theirs, who shall be masters in Europe. If
 "now you refuse peace to us, and our allies,
 "upon our *honour*, we will come to seek for
 "it in *London*, and there we shall *assuredly find*
 "it. Reply quickly, for the disarming must
 "commence within a *week*, or hostilities in a
 "*month*."

"*Risum teneatis Britanni & Hiberni.*"

There are French writers on every art and science who are an ornament to their country, and to human nature, but in that respectable list I cannot class Mr. Dupont, and far less should I compare him to heroic names of antiquity. He is neither an Agamemnon, an Ulysses, nor a Nestor; but in argument, and not improbably in heroism, bears a nearer resemblance to Thersites. I take notice of him merely because I know that multitudes of his countrymen are inflated with similar vain ideas of their power and prowess. Indeed, diffidence is not a characteristic feature of our neighbours. Whenever the brazen throat of war shall summon Britain to arms, there is no doubt we shall have our ears stunned with invasion: our enemies without, and their emissaries within, will

ring the changes on these imaginary perils; and probably, without any substantial hopes of conquest, they may flatter themselves of being able to confine us to mere defensive operations, to intimidate, and disconcert the nation, and to injure public confidence and credit. For this reason, I shall take a more comprehensive view, and enter into a more minute discussion of this subject, than has yet been attempted. Such discussion will at least administer some consolation to the inexperienced, and to those of weak fibre. It will from thence be obvious, that unless the nation and its governors are ideots, cowards and traitors, we are invulnerable at home, and that we should rather solicit than dread the execution of these impotent threats. From some general animadversions, I shall proceed to a specific refutation of this Gallic Quixote.

Under the two following propositions the subject may be illustrated. Is France able, as this writer boasts, to subdue and conquer Great Britain and Ireland; and secondly, were she really capable of these military wonders and miracles, would the other powers of Europe tamely look on, and see the downfall of such an important member of the European States?

To answer these propositions by a peremptory negative, and dogmatic assertion, would be to follow a bad example in argumentation, whose ignorance and presumption deserves to be exposed; a man who substitutes raving for logick, declamation for demonstration, calumny for evidence, and gasconading for true courage. But to proceed with regularity, it will be necessary to glance at the successive invasions of our envied Island.

The Romans, under Julius Cæsar, 54 A. C. departing from the opposite coast of Gaul, landed in Kent, on the banks of the river Stoure, near to Sandwich, and some miles to the north of Dover. The Saxons, P. C. 550, from civil dissensions, and the inroads of the Scots, Picts, and Irish, were invited into England, under Hengist and Horfa, and landed in the Isle of Thanet, a few miles north of Dover Straits, and near to Margate. The Danes, and other Northern pirates, P. C. 789, invaded England by the Isle of Thanet, and made several other predatory incursions on the north and south coasts of this island and of Ireland. In the beginning of the eleventh century, three Danish Kings, in succession, usurped the English throne. William the First, the Norman bastard, P. C. 1066,

1066, landed at Pevensey, in Suffex, a few miles north of Beachey Head, and not far from Hastings.

From this last mentioned period, that is, from the 11th to the 16th century, we find England successively engaged in the religious Crusades, in conquering and defending her provinces in France, in repelling the inroads of the Welch and Scotch, and in civil wars. There are no instances, in all this interval of five hundred years, wherein France ventured to set foot in England, except once, by the express invitation of the discontented English nobles, and the mandatory anathemas of the Pope, during the turbulent reign of King John; once, during the unfortunate reign of Henry VI. and once, in an unsuccessful expedition against the Isle of Wight, in the reign of Henry VIII. Spain was the first whose power and ambition prompted her, in 1588, to the hazardous and ruinous experiment of an invasion of this Island; and with the delusive hopes of its easy conquest, became sacrifices to their own imprudence.

It is worthy of particular remark, that during this victorious career of England, when
she

she invaded and conquered a large portion of France; when Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt were amongst the catalogue of her trophies, she was not only unsupported by Scotland, but had at the same time to defend herself against that brave Northern neighbour, whose imperious and venal nobles were partizans and pensioners of France. Ireland at that period added very little strength to England. Since the beginning of the present century, not only our external, but also our internal strength is prodigiously increased. The jarring interests, prejudices, and jealousies of both Islands, together with their civil and religious dissensions, are now subsided and healed; an event in which all have equal reason to rejoice. For it is not improbable, had not England, Scotland, and Ireland been united under one Crown, and incorporated into one compact government, one people, and one interest, that they might, sooner or later, have shared the fate of the ancient Greek Republics. Some enterprising monarch of the Continent, like the crafty Macedonian, would not have failed to take advantages of their civil dissensions and weakness, and in the end, would have crushed them into tributary provinces.

Such

Such fortunate union of government and interest, authorises me, in direct contradiction to this arrogant insinuation, that Great Britain and Ireland retain their liberty, property and political rank, at the discretion and forbearance of France, to say and to demonstrate, that the British empire is not inferior to France in absolute, and is superior in relative strength. Is France superior in Asia, or even now in America, in ships or in sailors? If France, merely from the mistaken policy, negligence, and ignorance of our Legislators, has more than double the population of Great Britain and Ireland, the latter have more than treble the extent of sea-coast, a circumstance so extremely essential to maritime superiority. Great Britain and Ireland, in point of situation, have some prominent advantages, as durable as the globe, and of which no human power nor malevolence can deprive them: a general convulsion of the elements is alone adequate to subvert nature. An island in war must have the advantage over a continent. The first has but a small extent, and a few specific points to defend; and is accessible but by one draw-bridge, a navy; whereas France has many avenues by which an enemy could enter. As to this threatened invasion, which is to put an end to our existence, it would puzzle this mettlesome
French

French writer to satisfy his sober readers, how that is to take place before the British fleet is defeated. How are those French Grenadiers to be exported hither; by wings, balloons, or cork jackets? The writer should know that it is an eternal axiom of Great Britain never to desert the dominion of the Channel, nor to drop the trident, until she has encountered a series of naval shocks and disasters, and is driven from the last plank. The history of Athens under Themistocles furnishes her with a conspicuous precedent of the inefficacy of the most formidable invasion on record, when disabled by defeat at sea. Nor is the British history barren of such decisive precedents. Great Britain and Ireland also raise, annually, a revenue superior to France, including in the general estimate, as is done in France, their parochial and other extraneous subsidies. In fact, Great Britain and Ireland not only outstrip France on the true element of dominion, in maritime strength and numbers, but they can even bring as many fighting men into the field, as France can spare to invade them.

France cannot possibly raise during war above 300,000 land forces; at least she cannot maintain more without crippling her marine. One
third

third of these, however, are indispensable, merely for stationary guards of her frontiers, and foreign possessions. Their offensive land army, therefore, cannot, at the extremity, exceed 100,000. Let us see what our two islands have to oppose to this invading force. If the northern part of this island, Scotland, was to raise a militia in proportion to that maintained by the south part, England, which surely is but reasonable and equitable, then the united militia of Great Britain might, with very little additional difficulty or expence, be augmented to 100,000 effective and athletic men. It was by a feudal militia that England gained all her victories and conquests in France. The metropolis would be far more effectually secured against foreign or domestic depredators, by substituting ten thousand periodical militia, in lieu of the present banditti of trained bands and night watch. Great Britain can also in a short time make a sufficient augmentation to her regular forces; she can treble her artillery, double her infantry, and make the usual war addition to her powerful cavalry. Ireland with ease could, and should, be encouraged to raise a militia, in the proportion of one-third to that of Great Britain; making at the same time a similar addition to her regular artillery, infantry, and cavalry. She is also provided

provided with a large army of disciplined volunteers. The two islands are so happily situated that they could not be prevented, by any foreign foe, from mutually co-operating with, and assisting each other, according to the exigency, and the movements of the invader. By Wales, and by Scotland, there are a variety of practicable and easy channels of communication.

Nor is this one half of the effective force with which Great Britain and Ireland could burst indignant upon, and overwhelm their invaders. A large auxiliary reserve of militia might easily be disciplined throughout all the parishes of Great Britain and Ireland, to supply the emergencies of the field. It is also well known that no nation in Europe has the materials of an equestrian force, equally numerous and formidable to that of Great Britain. The natives are half trained to horsemanship; and all the essentials of the equestrian exercise can be acquired in three months, without much trouble or expence. Indeed it would rather be an agreeable and manly amusement, and a meritorious revival of the ancient tournaments. Volunteer associations of this description would not fail to call forth a tremendous strength against invaders. Cornwall alone, where, probably the
invaders

invaders would land, boasts of a hardy and rugged race of 80,000 miners. Are our enemies aware what strenuous efforts could be made by rich companies, corporations, cities, and individuals, to assist their country both by sea and land; and that these alone are capable of building and equipping a powerful navy? But why should we boast of partial patriotism? In such an emergency, all capable of bearing arms would repair to the public standard, and become soldiers. They would be unworthy of liberty and property who dare not fight in its defence. A virtuous and brave nation, like an individual roused into indignation, is capable of the most desperate acts, especially when contending "pro aris & focis;" and would either prove victorious, or bury themselves in their country's ruins.

As it would certainly be incumbent on Great Britain, in such a crisis of her empire, to exert every sinew, and every nerve of strength, it may not be improper to point out to her Legislators, two other easy methods of rendering herself infinitely more formidable by land and by sea. For a defensive war of posts, he who can expeditiously load, fire, and hit his mark, is an excellent soldier. The rifle gun, the cross and steel bow, and
long

long pike, seem singly, and in conjunction, extremely well calculated for such irregular combat, and suited both to infantry and cavalry. General Lloyd, in his military history of Germany, calculates that, on an average, 1 only of 400 shots takes effect in land battles; and perhaps the odds is greater in sea-fights. Marshal Saxe also, in his *Reveries*, censures the impotent noise of ordnance and musquetry, and especially of platoon firing. It is a fact, that during all the last German war, there were not two thousand British troops in the list of killed. History informs us, that in former ages the English archers, by the wise policy of our forefathers, were trained with peculiar diligence to become expert marksmen, and were of infinite service in the wars and victories in France. These military essentials are now shamefully neglected by us, and are sacrificed to empty parade.

But it is not alone the viciousness and degeneracy of our modern military institutions, which render us less formidable on land to an invader; our imperious system of Game Laws is calculated to damp and suppress the use and exercise of fire-arms amongst our yeomanry, to expose a brave people in the day of national danger, and to pave the way for the

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introduction and success of a more sagacious antagonist. Would those who are obliged to buy annual licences to shoot partridges, be the defenders of Great Britain against a foreign enemy? Is it prudent to sacrifice the dearest interest and security of the nation to such a paltry revenue, and to all the other wretched chicanery of the Game Statutes? Besides, there is no effectual method to wean the lower class of the nation from the brutal art of boxing, but by substituting some other manly exercise, more entertaining and useful, and which it might be proper to encourage, equally with horse-racing, by lucrative and honorary rewards.

Great Britain has another powerful, but, hitherto, overlooked resource of naval strength. From the parochial charity schools of England more than ten thousand sturdy boys, turned of ten years of age, might be annually selected, and sent on board of ships stationed for that purpose in the different ports and harbours. By one year's training, they would furnish a constant recruit both to the royal and mercantile service, and would in a considerable degree alleviate the rigours of the impress duty. These are truly the children of the state; but during the year of their naval scholarship in port, their
respective

respective parishes should be responsible for their cloathing and maintenance, and should then be exonerated from future expence.

Marshal Saxe, in his *Reveries*, allows that 50,000 men are sufficient to decide the fate of any battle on land. Indeed, there are few places in England where so many troops on each side could be brought into action. Besides, an army acting on the defensive, and in their own country, particularly if that country is full of defiles and passes, is equal to double or treble the number of assailants: the former having the choice of ground, can to its natural strength add artificial; and in other parts they are defended by regular fortifications. If the French, as their volunteer herald seems to threaten, should come over with all the pomp and number of Xerxes, and with all the fanaticism of crusaders, they must speedily return, or perish by famine and disease. In truth, conquest is neither a necessary consequence of superior number, nor of revenue. If such was the inevitable result, Greece should have been but a morsel to Xerxes, and China should be able to swallow up Europe.

Again, would the other powers of Europe sit, like the audience in a theatre, or like the gods and goddesses on Mount Ida, as inactive spectators of these Gallic triumphs, and British degradation? On this subject we must be cautious of drawing conclusions from remote precedents, such as Rome, Carthage, &c. because the circumstances and parallel are extremely different in many points of comparison. Europe is now subdivided into many powerful states, who will not suffer the political equilibrium to be so immensely deranged, and whose private interest and policy would unite them in opposition to any invader.. The modern history of Europe furnishes instances in abundance of the truth of this proposition. The writer, in his impetuosity, forgot to reflect, that whilst France may be occupied in the invasion of Britain, one or more auxiliary armies in the latter's favour may find their way into France; and it is not impossible might traverse from Dunkirk to Brest, before the invader had set foot in the Bank of England. Would Great Britain's allies be idle spectators? Might not an army of Hanoverians, Hessians, Brunswickers, Hollanders, and Prussians, return the favour of the French visit? Even Austria might think it a convenient opportunity to recover some of the provinces of which she was plundered

plundered by France, who has repeatedly taken advantage of the former's misfortunes. England has often rescued Austria and Holland from the arbitrary gripe both of Spain and France. Would the northern nations of Europe be such conspirators against their dearest interests, as to acquiesce in France taking possession of all the intermediate avenues and strong holds through which their commerce must be wasted not only to the south of Europe, but to every part of the globe? Would these nations submit to such an enormous grasp of power in the hands of France, whose general character, at least in her politics with other nations, is neither conspicuous for moderation nor plain dealing? Nor is it discreet policy in France to avow such devouring strength and terrific rage, in her new constitution. A proclamation of this tremendous nature in her present state is premature, and is sufficient to arm every other power against her propensity to usurpation.

It appears, on many accounts, problematical, whether an invasion of Great Britain by France would not be more injurious to the invader than to the defender. Persia was disgraced, and nearly ruined by the invasion of Greece. Spain has not, after two centuries, recovered the loss of

her armada. France was no gainer by her repeated invasions of Germany, Italy, and Holland. Lewis XIV. with half a million of soldiers, and without the necessity of crossing any sea, was driven back from Holland, which could not then muster one third of the present effective strength of Great Britain and Ireland. What did Lewis XIV. and XV. gain to their country by their wild crusades and attempts to invade Great Britain and Ireland? I will spare them the mortification of recounting all the negative proofs and trophies of conquest. It might, probably, be a fortunate circumstance for Great Britain and Ireland, were France to put those public menaces into execution. By thus grappling with our domestic lion, she might be disabled from doing us any injury during a long period, and we might pursue, in peace, our commerce and industry. There cannot be any just grounds of alarm to deprecate the attempt as a national calamity. Strange as it may appear to her heroic writers, France is not such a dangerous enemy, now when she has twelve hundred kings, as when she had only one.

It is of the last importance to be enabled to predict, and with tolerable certainty, in what part of our coast we are most exposed to invasion. England, during several centuries, con-

tinued

tinued to invade France, principally by the narrow passes of the channel, from whence we might "a priori" suppose, that France would pursue a similar system of proximity. But the immense improvements and revolutions, during the three last centuries, in naval architecture and tactics, in fortification and engineering, require harbours more deep and convenient to insure the invaders footing and progress. It is obvious, from the relative geography alone of Great Britain and France, that the maritime and channel counties of Cornwall, Devonshire, part of Somersetshire, Dorsetshire, Hampshire, Sussex, and Kent, comprehended in an arch from Plymouth to London, must be the theatres of invasion by any southern foe, such as France and Spain. The Essex coast is in no great danger from that quarter; and further north on the German ocean, it is not probable that these southern foes will ever venture, at least for the purpose of effective invasion, but only as a diversion from the grand object. Throughout this extent of coast the defender has but a few fixed points, or posts of peculiar consequence, to contend with the enemy; these are, Plymouth, Portsmouth, the dock-yards on the Medway and the Thames, and the metropolis, the latter of which are defended from approaches by sea, by Sheerness,

and by Tilbury forts. The enemy could not expect to take any of these by a "coup de main." Plymouth and Portsmouth would require a regular siege. At the same time suspicions might rationally be entertained, that the two great commercial cities on the western coast of England, Bristol and Liverpool, might be included in the collateral objects of invasion or depredation, on the part of France.

If ever a northern maritime nation should invade Great Britain, of which there is no instance during the last thousand years, such invasion would, probably, be to the north of Dover, and perhaps in a line between Harwich and Sheerness. Dover appears to be the central point between the landing places of southern and northern invaders. Indeed it is not improbable, notwithstanding the perils of the navigation and coast, that they might attempt to molest Hull, and also to cut off the principal magazine of fuel from London; the inconveniences of which might be prevented by an additional stock in reserve. Besides, an enemy would find it no easy task to subdue upwards of 100,000 sturdy colliers, who might be assembled in the neighbourhood of Newcastle, Shields, and Whitehaven. From attacks on Edinburgh and Glasgow,

gow; the invader would, probably, reap as few laurels. Most of the principal manufacturing cities and towns of Great Britain are without the reach of surprize or pillage, by being placed at some distance from the sea coast, with which, however, they have an easy communication by rivers or canals.

As no foreign invasion for the subjugation of England had been attempted, during five centuries, until the reign of Queen Elizabeth, it may be both curious and useful to examine the modern disposition of the defending troops against such malevolent projects. Queen Elizabeth's principal camp ~~was~~ at Tilbury Fort, obviously, to cover the Thames and the metropolis. In the last, and in the preceding war, Coxheath near Maidstone in Kent, and Warley contiguous to Brentwood in Essex, were the principal camps for the defence of England: a few regiments of cavalry were also assembled on Salisbury plain. Plymouth and Portsmouth had neither fortifications nor garrisons adequate to their defence, and were excluded almost without the pale of succour. The following celebrated Essay will enable the reader to judge whether this neglect of our principal naval arsenals, and this disposition of our encamped forces, was commendable

mendable or censurable. Exclusive of strong fortifications and garrisons to secure Plymouth and Portsmouth, General Lloyd (the author here referred to) distributes the defending troops into three principal, and nearly equidistant positions; Hall Down, near Exeter; Portsdown, and the New Forest near Portsmouth; and the third, on the borders of Suffex and Kent, close to the Teise, a small branch of the Medway, a few miles south of Coxheath, and laying almost half way between, and in a parallel line with Hastings and Tilbury Fort.

In the preceding Introduction, I have endeavoured to supply a part of what G. L. had recommended and left unfinished; an Estimate of the absolute and relative strength of Great Britain and France. Our author had before eminently distinguished himself as a writer and a general, in his renowned *Military History of the last seven years war in Germany*. The present treatise on the invasion and defence of England was printed in London in 1779, during the latter part of the unfortunate American war, at the critical period when the fleets of France and Spain rode triumphant in the Channel, when our veteran regiments were mouldering in North America, and invasion was thundered at our gates.

This

• This publication, had it not then been suppressed, might have given rise to a parliamentary and public scrutiny, and might well alarm those to whom the safety and defence of the nation was then entrusted. But I am firmly persuaded that France was infinitely more interested than Great Britain in its suppression.

General Lloyd's Treatise reflects more light on a late litigated and important topic, the propriety of the Fortification system, than all the rhetoric and wrangling of Parliament. And as this system still continues to be reprobated by numbers, the public will be enabled from hence to derive much useful information. How far the present system of domestic fortification may be carried to extremes, or may be injudiciously directed, I am ignorant. This I will venture to maintain, that whoever would attempt to persuade us that the external dock-yards of Great Britain, on the Channel coast, are sufficiently secure without fortifications, or without fortifications both strong, and, as far as art can operate, impregnable, are liable to the imputation of either a deficiency of judgment or of patriotism. Where nature has left us weak or exposed in any political vital part, there art, certainly, should

should be substituted. In our own formation we may draw this principle and instruction from the Divine architect. The fort now constructing at Gosport is evidently from a hint of G—l L—d: its utility he explains.

In a word, are those to be considered as the public's friend or foe, who point out to them their vulnerable and crazy parts, or those who would endeavour to lull them into fatal apathy and security? This observation is universal, and is equally applicable to nations and to individuals; to those on land, and to those on sea.

The following short account of G—l L—d, communicated by Mr. Drummond, a gentleman descended from an ancient and noble family in Scotland, whose ancestors were ruined by their unfortunate attachment to the exiled house of Stuart; a gentleman who has since atoned for the mistaken zeal of his family, and for his own juvenile and unavoidable attachments, by rendering eminent political services to Great Britain, and who is now suing for the titles and estates of the Earldom of Perth. It will appear from the history of this able engineer, and to which Mr. D—d was privy, that all the alledged phantoms of communicating improper

improper information to the enemy is futile and absurd: that in 1744 and in 1756, France had this identical plan of invasion chalked out to her by G—l L—d, who was then engaged in the service of France and of the Pretender. It was just 39 years after the first sketch of this plan of invasion, that the following Rhapsody on the enemy's objects, and the means of defeating such attempts, was digested and printed; and after the Author had been engaged in a variety of hot service, as a general officer, in the Russian and Imperial armies. From this we may conclude, that the subject had been arranged, corrected and matured, with all the military perspicuity and judgment, with which G. L—d^o was so eminently endowed.

Mr.

MR. DRUMMOND'S LETTER

TO THE

AUTHOR OF THE INTRODUCTION.

MY First knowledge of General Lloyd was in France, in 1744. He was then, as I understood, a Lay Brother in some religious house. Mr. Gordon, my tutor, recommended him to my father as a proper person to teach me Geography and Field Engineering, in which line Mr. Lloyd had given specimens of superior talents to some Scotch and Irish officers in the French service. He appeared to be between 20 and 30 years of age, was a Welchman by birth, and said to be of a respectable family; he had received a liberal education, and although designed for the church, he said he had been some time with a Lawyer, before he went to France. His aim then was the army, but having no friend to procure him a commission, he was persuaded by some British priests to take the habit of a Noviciate or Monk. Nevertheless his genius still continued for the military line, and he was engaged to attend my elder brother and myself, who joined the

the French army under Marshal Saxe in 1745. Mr. L. was with us at the battle of Fontenoy, which I believe was the first actual service he ever saw. My station on that day being a Cadet in the corps of Engineers, as well as a Lieutenant in Lord John Drummônd's regiment of royal Scotch, Mons. de Rochauard, the chief engineer, (under whom I acted) saw an acuteness in Mr. Lloyd's manner of drawing and making sketches of the ground about the villages of Fontenoy (which was a part of my duty to examine and plan) that he got an order from Marshal Saxe to allow Mr. L. to wear our corps uniform, and to attend me on horseback as an assistant draughtsman, with the pay of a sub-ensign.

When the expedition to Scotland was set on foot, Mr. Lloyd was appointed *third Engineer*, with the rank of Captain, by a commission from the Pretender. He then went to Nantz, and was with me on board the Elizabeth in the action with the Lion, Capt. Sir Piercy Brett, in the Channel; he behaved gallantly, was wounded in the right shoulder, and after the fight we went out of the Elizabeth on board a brig, which carried us after the young Chevalier to Scotland, where we attended him till
the

the Prince arrived at Carlisle. Mr. L. was dispatched from thence with letters to our friends in Wales; he did not join us again, but went into South Wales, where he reassumed the character of a Priest, and became a spy to look round the coasts of Wales and of the Channel, for an expected French fleet. In this tour he examined all the coasts from Milford Haven round the Bristol Channel, to Bridgewater and Barnstaple Bay; continuing his survey from thence to Plymouth and Dover, and from the Downs to Margate and London. No man ever was more correct with his eye; he saw at once the advantages and disadvantages of ground, and his remarks were made with so much penetration and judgment, that all his observations were to be depended upon. At length, by some accident, he became suspected, and was taken up in London by a General Warrant. When I came to London a prisoner of war in the winter of 1746, after the battle of Culloden, I found my friend Lloyd at Carington's, the messenger, in Jermyn-street, where I, with some of my brother officers, were lodged for safety. I rejoiced to see him, but it was not known that he had been with us in Scotland, otherwise he must have been tried as a rebel, and have

2 suffered

suffered as such, his mission, knowledge, and great abilities having made him a considerable object and character of that time.

In 1747 I got him relieved by means of my relation, a noble Duke, and I then employed him under the denomination of a tutor, seeming never to have known him before. In the same year he went with me to France, and followed me to the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, where he became in high esteem with Marshal Lovendhall: during that siege he obtained the rank of *Major*, and was of infinite service in mounting batteries, in choosing ground and exploring mines, as well as in opening of sluices. When I went to Spain in 1748, my father recommended Major Lloyd to the Earl Marshal, who was at that time in great reputation with the King of Prussia; this nobleman recommended Lloyd to his brother, Marshal Keith, and when I returned from my Spanish voyage and survey of the coast of Terra Firma in 1754, I met with him in Paris. At which time there being a plan laid for an invasion of England, Lloyd was recommended to the Marshal duc de Bellisle, then Minister of war, who had also appointed me to come to England as Commissary General to superintend all the French prisoners, taken before

fore the formal declaration of war in 1756, Lloyd's former knowledge of the British coast, the exactness of his descriptions, and his genius as a spy, afforded him great advantages on this occasion; in consequence of which he resigned his Prussian rank, accepted a new Field Officer's commission in the French service, with an appointment of five louis *per diem*, to re-survey the British coast, and to report thereon to the Duc de Bellisle. He accordingly came to England in 1756, re-assumed the habit *Bourgeoise*, and having nothing of a military look, he went where he pleased, as a trader or rider. Thus he re-examined the British coast, and laid the foundation of his much esteemed Treatise upon the natural strength of Britain; pointing out all that could be done by invasion, and all that might be done by defence. His report, however, made the French Ministry change their intentions of invading Britain, and the Mareschal Duc de Bellisle was better pleased at being sent to Minorca than to attempt a landing at Torbay.

Lloyd then quitted England and went to Germany, where he was employed some years in the Russian and Austrian service, and promoted to higher rank. From my remaining in Great Britain

tain after 1756, and quitting the army, as well as going to the West Indies in 1758, I lost my friend 'till about 1776, when I again met with him in London under the title of General Lloyd: he then told me that he had made his peace here, and afterwards inform'd me that he had obtained a pension upon the Chelsea establishment.

JOHN DRUMMOND.

*London, Fermyn-street,
Nov. 5, 1790.*

[Page 1]

and the other side of the river, as well as
towards the West. In 1881 I left my
house and about 1885 when I began to work
and all the time I was in the service of General
he then told me that he had made his place
here, and afterwards informed me that he had
obtained a position upon the Great
Hill.

JOHN DRUMMOND.

CHAP. I.
A
R H A P S O D Y
O N
FRENCH POLITICS, &c.

IT is impossible to calculate, with any degree of probability, the duration and event of a war, unless we are acquainted with the political system, principles of government, and resources of the contending powers. I shall, therefore, give a short view of them, which will enable the Reader to form some judgment of the present state of affairs.

C H A P. I.

*A general view of the Politics of France
during the two last Centuries.*

WHILE the House of Austria was all-powerful in Europe, and possessed of many provinces on the west side of the Rhine, now united to France, it was evident that the French nation could have no other permanent system of politics, but that which tended to reduce that House within narrower bounds, particularly in the Low Countries, and towards the Rhine. Accordingly, we find France continually employed in raising disturbances in Germany, Italy, Spain, &c. and exciting the different powers of Europe and Turkey against Austria. Richelieu—having reduced the Hugonots, took an active part at the latter end of the war, which had been maintained in Germany for near thirty years ;
3 and

and by the treaty of Westphalia, the French, as one of the guaranties, obtained a right to interfere in the affairs of Germany, of which they have availed themselves on every occasion to embarrass the House of Austria. More than once, they brought her to the brink of destruction, and had it not been for the powerful support and assistance of the maritime powers, particularly of England, she must have fallen a victim to the ambition of France. Those powers who feared Austria, very naturally looked up to France for protection, and increased her strength by the addition of their forces.

During the minority of Lewis XIV. the administration of Mazarine was almost totally confined to domestic occurrences, which were sufficiently embarrassing to occupy his whole attention.

Lewis XIV. on taking the reins of government, pursued the system of his

predecessors with regard to Austria. Having, in the beginning of his reign, met with great success in war, and added some provinces to his crown, he became ambitious, from that principle, rather than from necessity, (for he was already sufficiently powerful to have nothing to fear from Austria) Lewis did not cease to embroil Europe, almost during his whole reign. In the course of his wars, he found himself checked, chiefly by the maritime powers; England was out of his reach; without ships of war nothing could be done against her. Seconded by able ministers, in a few years, to the astonishment of all the world, he raised a powerful fleet, and, for a little time, maintained a superiority at sea, of which he availed himself in an attempt to reinstate James II. on the throne of England, but without success. The confederacy formed against the French monarch on the continent became so powerful, particularly towards the close of his reign, that the whole
force

force of his kingdom was scarce sufficient to resist the progress of the allied armies. The marine was of course abandoned, and sunk nearly into the insignificant state in which he found it. Soon after Lewis XV. had mounted the French throne, Cardinal Fleury became prime minister; happily for France, who wanted peace to recover from the innumerable losses which the ambition of Lewis XIV. had brought upon her. This prelate, from principle, as well as temper, pursued invariably a pacific system; the wars excited by the turbulent spirit of Alberoni for the kingdom of Naples, and that on the *Rhine*, occasioned by the *pretensions* of Augustus II. to the throne of Poland, were transitory, and of very short duration. The House of Austria having imprudently engaged in that quarrel, Fleury availed himself of her distressful situation, to tear Lorraine from her, which connected and compleated the French frontier on the German side.

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On the death of Charles VI. a new and general war broke out in Germany, wherein the maritime powers engaged also. Cardinal Fleury wished to keep France neuter, believing either that Austria would find sufficient employment from the several Princes who formed pretensions to the Emperor's succession; and that by remaining neuter, the French might mediate and dictate the terms of peace, without partaking of the dangers and expences of the war: Or, perhaps, judging that France, recovered from her losses, and strengthened by her new acquisitions, would always be a match for Austria hereafter, whatever might be the event of a war. The cardinal, however, was over-ruled, and a general confederacy was formed against the House of Austria, which tended to annihilate her entirely: Indeed the success did not answer the hopes and expectations of the confederates, and things remained in great part, as they were at the commencement of the war. The King
of

of Prussia acquired Silesia, the King of Sardinia increased his possessions in Lombardy, and a settlement was procured for Don Philip, in the same country. The French and Spanish trade suffered greatly in the course of this war; for the expences of the land armies in Germany and Italy were so excessive, that no effort could be made by these two powers to establish a marine. Our trade and navigation increased, and furnished the means to pursue the war on the continent. France in the mean time excited disturbances in Scotland, which soon were quelled; because, for want of a marine, she could not support them, had she really meant to do it.

The last war offers us a new system of politics adopted by the French, contrary and opposite to that which they had for many ages prosecuted. The House of Austria being no longer an object of fear or jealousy, they engaged in a con-

a confederacy, calculated for her aggrandizement, at the expence of a Prince whose alliance they had heretofore, and ought always to have courted. However formidable they might believe France to be, Austria had likewise increased in wealth, power, and, above all, her administration, in regard to finances, &c. was much improved. It seemed, therefore, highly advantageous for the French that there should be Princes in Germany, able, in some degree, to check the power of Austria. Prussia was, of all others, the most proper to be opposed to her, as they had done it with success during the preceding war. There is no explaining a system so very contrary to the apparent interests of France, unless we suppose that court had an after-game to play, as circumstances might offer, during the course of the hostilities.

The French originally engaged to furnish only twenty-four thousand men, avowedly

avowedly to deliver Saxony; and, if that had been effected, 'tis probable they would have forced the contending parties to conclude such a peace as they approved of. They had a numerous army to enforce their mediation. I cannot think they intended seriously to promote in the least the greatness of their ancient rivals in power, and much less at the expence of Prussia, whom they will find a powerful and necessary ally, in case of any future war with the former. The negotiations at Teschen last year, and the part they acted there, evince that they are not real friends to the House of Austria.

By engaging partially in the war in Germany, it is probable the French thought they might direct their principal attention to their marine, and to the defence of their colonies. All their schemes were defeated by the extraordinary efforts of the King of Prussia, and the allied army. Their new-raised
fleet

fleet being beat and dispersed, our superiority at sea enabled us to overcome every obstacle; we conquered all we attacked, and reduced the House of Bourbon so low, that we might have prescribed any terms of peace. Unhappily we mistook entirely in the choice of our acquisitions, some of which, so far from being advantageous, have been one of the principal causes that brought the present calamities upon us. We attend too much to the contracted, and very often selfish, views of the merchants; we act upon too narrow a scale, like traders, and seldom as a powerful nation. In forming treaties, a Minister should have the whole globe before his eyes, and by no means confine himself to this or that province, or branch of trade; these are not to be overlooked, but they must never serve as a foundation for a treaty, unless you mean to reduce the nation to a company of mercantile people. Towards the end of the

the war the Duke of Choiseul became all-powerful in the French Ministry. He is a man of a bold, extensive, and enterprising genius. His country found in him the vastness of Richelieu, the activity of Louvois, the magnificence of Seignelay, the amiableness of Pomponne and . . . they dismissed him. He projected and concluded the Family Compact, which unites the different branches of the House of Bourbon in the closest connection, and we now see the effects of that master-piece of politics.

The great losses that the French suffered during the last war, the imminent danger with which the taking of the Havannah, in particular, threatened the rest of the Spanish dominions in America, very naturally drew the whole attention of both nations to us. It was obvious that while we were superior at sea, notwithstanding the disproportion of our land forces, in any future

future contest, their Colonies would always be exposed to the same danger, and if lost, might not always be restored at a peace. They have therefore attended to their marine alone; and have pursued this measure with such industry and activity, that a fleet has been raised by them which astonishes Europe, and must be very alarming to England. It is impossible to foresee how far success may correspond with their force or their ambition. Their views are great, and tend to reduce us within very narrow limits. That nothing should divert them from their main object, the French have, with the utmost care, avoided and prevented a German war, which might have engaged a part of their forces, and frustrated the general design against our country.

The present state of affairs enables us to resolve a political problem, often discussed

cuffed within and without doors, viz. Whether continental connections are useful or otherwise to this nation? I need not recapitulate the arguments for and against them; suffice it to say, that while we paid allies on the continent, the attention of France was so intirely taken up in the different wars in Germany, that she could not raise a marine in any degree proportioned to ours; that we have constantly maintained a decisive superiority at sea, which increased the power, glory, and political influence of the nation, notwithstanding the immense sums which were sent abroad for such connections; that since we have abandoned the continental system, France has acquired an unlimited influence in the different courts of Europe; without anxiety on that side, she has been enabled to direct the whole force of the House of Bourbon against England alone, and God knows what may be the issue of this, I fear, unequal
D. contest.

contest. Let us draw a veil over such an alarming prospect : Let every man exert himself to the utmost of his power for the service of his King and Country, that we may avert the storm which hangs over our heads, and baffle the efforts of our combined enemies.

Whoever considers the position of England, and of its Colonies, will perceive that our very existence depends on this circumstance alone, *viz.* that we should be superior at sea ; all our politics ought therefore to be directed to that object singly. Had we millions of armed men, equal in discipline to the Prussians, they can be of no use to defend our trade or Colonies ; and if we are reduced to defend England, all is over. Why has our fleet been neglected ? Why have the national funds been consumed and exhausted to multiply land forces, instead of being applied to raise a powerful fleet, which is the only force that can protect

protect us? It is impossible to explain this by any principle of reason; our militia alone are more than sufficient to repel any invaders, if our fleet be superior to theirs; and even the idea of an invasion in that case is absurd. Standing armies appear an useless burthen; and now, to our cost, they will be found totally inadequate to the defence of England and its Colonies.

Having abandoned continental connections, it became more than ever necessary to apply all our resources to the fleet. The question is by ~~no~~ means, whether it be equal or superior to what it was at any other period? I ask, why it is not superior to the fleet of the House of Bourbon? Does it arise from want of funds or men? Why do we not appropriate the sums employed in levying numberless corps, to build ships and raise twenty or thirty thousand marines? Why are not the new levies converted into

D. 2 marines?

marines? With proper encouragement this may be done, and unless it is done, we sink under the superior forces of the enemies.

Land forces are nothing. Marines are the only species of troops proper for this nation; they alone can defend and protect it effectually. During the peace they garrison all your ports in each quarter of the globe; in time of war your fleet is instantly manned; and by employing many of them, fewer seamen are wanted in proportion. Besides, a fleet having on board twelve or fifteen thousand marines, is equal to almost any enterprize against the enemy's settlements, and keeps them in continual anxiety in every part of the world. By this means the expence and delays attending the embarkation of a considerable body of land forces, destined to attack the enemy, would be spared, and the success become more certain. Every other

Another method to prevent the final ruin of this country will be hurtful or ineffectual. *A powerful fleet and thirty thousand marines, I repeat it, will save us from destruction, and nothing else.*

C H A P. II.

*Of the Force of Nations, particularly of
France, Spain, and Great Britain.*

NO Author, that I know of, has given any data which can enable us to calculate the force of nations; it is therefore with diffidence that I propose my ideas on the subject. I think that the power and strength of a nation depend on the number of its inhabitants and the quantity of their industry. This can be found and estimated only by the yearly revenues raised on the subject, which bear a given proportion to the yearly production of the whole nation. It is the revenue which enables the Sovereign to maintain fleets and armies. It is the number of inhabitants which furnishes men for the one and the other; and in these I place the absolute force of a nation; for its relative force will depend on position,

tion, quantity of industry, strength of contiguous powers, military system, nature of the government, &c. which vary often in the course of a few years. It is therefore necessary we should attend only to the absolute force of nations, when we compare them with each other, in order to form a general scale, by which we measure their strength.

France contains above twenty millions of inhabitants: the yearly revenues of that kingdom amount to above sixteen millions sterling, five of which being appropriated to pay the interest of the national debt, eleven only will remain free, and according to our system, the absolute force of the French nation will be thirty-one.

Spain contains ~~more~~ more than seven millions and a half of inhabitants in Europe, and above two in America, with a yearly revenue of above five millions;

so that her absolute force will amount to about fifteen. Consequently the absolute force of the House of Bourbon will be found equal to forty-six.

To this sum may be added that of our Revolted Colonies, which increases still the force united against us.

I wish that others, better informed than I am, would calculate the force of my own country upon this principle, and compare it with that of the House of Bourbon: though the contrast might appear very unfavourable to England, I do not doubt but her relative force, compared also with that of her enemies, would make amends for the enormous disproportion in point of inhabitants and revenues.

C H A P. III.

Of the Analogy between the Form of Government and the State of War.

DESPOTISM acts with the rapidity of a torrent; like it it leaves desolation and solitude behind, or it declines into a lethargy. In despotism there is no system; its motions are instantaneous, and arise from trifles, or the caprice of the moment. They are extremely violent, but transitory. If you can resist, or more safely avoid, their first impetuosity, you will easily conquer in the end.

Monarchy, though not so violent and rapid in its motions, is sufficiently strong to collect and exert the national forces. When endowed with wisdom, it directs them, so that they procure the most general and permanent advantages. It

is like a majestic river, which, if kept within bounds, and its waters judiciously distributed, embellishes and enriches the country. But when Administration is too violent, this beneficent river becomes a torrent, and ruins the country: if weak, it branches out into a thousand small rivulets, which finally dwindle to nothing.

As in monarchies the whole power of the state is centered in one man, and the exercise of it depends upon his will alone, to prevent a sudden and capricious use of it, which in a short time might ruin the state, it ought to be a maxim established in this kind of government, that the administration should be confined to many people, that the departments should be separated, and that the council of state should be numerous, because the government of one man being naturally quick and violent, it requires a number of checks to prevent

an improper use, or rather abuse, of such extensive powers.

As all military operations require vigour and constancy, it is evident that a monarchical government is singularly adapted to war. Different from despotism, regular plans and systems may be pursued, and the government is sufficiently strong to execute them with the necessary vigour. As the subjects are attached to the Sovereign chiefly by the idea of glory, they cheerfully concur with him in supporting an offensive war; if successful, their efforts increase, and therefore are not easily checked. Misfortunes, and consequently a defensive war, allay their courage. They soon perceive they do not fight for themselves, and feel only the miseries of the war, which they suppose is carried on to gratify the ambition and caprice of the sovereign, or of some favourite. Hence it is, that monarchies in general are more adapted to an offensive than a defensive war.

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Pursuing the metaphor adopted above, I will say that a republican government is like a great river, formed by a multiplicity of springs and rivulets, different in that from a despotic, or a monarchy, which arises from one alone. If the comparison be just, it follows, that in this kind of government there should be a sufficient force to collect and unite the different springs, and give the whole that *precise direction* which is most advantageous. A republican government, however, labours under this very great disadvantage: It is almost impossible to determine what degree of power ought to be vested in the executive part of the state, so that it should be sufficient to answer every purpose of government, and how to form such checks as may effectually prevent any abuse of that power to the danger of the state. Is it too much, liberty is gone; is it too little, anarchy ensues. The very long duration of the republic of Venice would induce one to conclude, that those wise

repub-

républicans had resolved this very difficult problem.

The extreme difficulty of *collecting*, *uniting*, and *directing* the national forces in a republican government, shews that it is by no means calculated for war, and much less for an offensive one. Its principles being founded in equality, it is evident that war of every kind ought to be avoided, because it necessarily throws too much power into the hands of one or few men, which finally destroy the government. It is also from the want of unity and sufficient force to exert the powers of the state, that all confederacies, however formidable, have failed in their schemes, if the war has been of any duration. The famous league of Cambray, the leagues formed against France at different times, and against Austria; that against Prussia in the last war, and a hundred more, were dissolved without producing any effect proportioned to their forces.

Repub-

Republics, unless formed upon military principles, as was that of the Romans, are totally unfit for action. Nothing could unite the Greek republics against Persia, till the time of Alexander the Great, when they had nearly lost their liberty; but when attacked, what prodigious efforts did they not make for the common cause. It is certainly true, that republics, unless forced by the immediate sense of danger, never have that unanimity and vigour necessary to carry on a war with any probability of success, and therefore are proper only for a defensive war. There, indeed, their efforts increase in proportion to the danger with which they are threatened; and if the motives arise from civil or religious principles, they generally become invincible. When such motives disappear, and the sense of danger vanishes, each party pursues its own interest, and the confederacy is dissolved.

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I am so convinced of the truth of this reasoning, that I have not the least doubt, if we could hold New-York, Long Island, Rhode Island, and Philadelphia, and cease to make those fruitless and unmeaning excursions in the American woods, that the Congress and the rebel people, no longer united by the sense of fear, would soon dissolve their confederacy, and a more favourable opportunity would offer of restoring peace and union between them and the mother country. The troops employed on the American Continent might enable us to strike some capital stroke in the West Indies, which would constrain our enemies to bring a part of their forces to that country; for in the West Indies is their weak part, and there they may be attacked with advantage.

C H A P. IV.

Of the French Invasion expected: their objects: the difficulties which they have to encounter: and the advantages on the side of Great Britain.

WHILE the terrors of an invasion and its consequences hang over our heads, it is the duty of every man to contribute with his person and advice to the support of the state, and point out the means which appear proper to defeat the designs of our enemies. With this view I have wrote the following discourse on the supposed invasion, and hope it may serve, in some measure, to render it fruitless, and inspire government, as well as the nation in general, with that confidence which the situation of our affairs require. Without confidence, his Majesty cannot avail himself

himself, with any prospect of success, of the national forces.

The enemies, superior at sea, and moreover, having a land force sufficient for any purpose, may have three objects in view. The first and most capital would be to land a powerful army in England. If success should follow their operations, it is evident we must conclude a peace on any terms, and the war is soon brought to an end. This enterprize is decisive, and therefore preferable to any other.

Their next object might be to take possession of the Western provinces, and to maintain themselves there for a few months only, without making any further progress into the country; then our commerce would be totally intercepted, and our whole attention confined to the immediate defence of the state; so that our foreign settlements would, in a short time, fall of course into their hands.

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Such an expedition is very bold, but it is equally dangerous, and it might prove fatal to their army. It is possible, therefore, that their shew and parade should be intended only to keep us at home, and ruin our trade, while, with the rest of their forces, they attack our colonies, Gibraltar, Minorca, &c.

Finally, to increase our distress, the combined enemies may land fifteen or twenty thousand men in the Bay of Galway, and cover themselves with the Shannon. The inhabitants of Connaught, equally poor and ignorant, might be induced to join them, and it would not be an easy matter to drive their army out of that country, if their fleet could support their army with provisions. Such a scheme offers all the advantages of *the* former, without being subject to the same difficulties as *the* second; the season being now far advanced, it is probable they may not think it eligible to attempt an invasion in England
for

for the present, and next year we shall be much better prepared to receive them. Perhaps they may then find it too dangerous an undertaking, and without adopting any of the two first plans we have supposed, they will attempt to land in Ireland, or only shew themselves in the Channel. However, as an invasion of England, with a powerful army, may be attended with fatal consequences, I shall confine my observation to that alone, and endeavour to shew how it may be frustrated.

The appearance and force of the combined fleet prove the intention of bringing affairs to a speedy conclusion, and had they met with us, and fought with success, I have not the least doubt they would have invaded this kingdom with a formidable number of troops. Every thing was then, and is now prepared for that purpose: when I consider their immense superiority, and foresee the probable event of a battle, I cannot help ap-

plauding those councils which tended to avoid it, as well as the prudence with which they were followed. Time and delays, at this moment, and at this season of the year, are a victory. Had we beat the combined fleet, little more would have been attained, whereas the loss of a battle might have been fatal.

While our fleet is entire, though we may, for a time, be forced out of the sea, yet am I persuaded that no invasion can take place. It is always a dangerous enterprize, and not to be attempted while there remains a possibility of our appearing at sea; which may happen from a thousand circumstances arising from wind and weather, in the winter especially, when the combined fleet must separate, and all communication with the army they may have landed must be cut off. Our fleet, in the mean time, may intercept their convoys, and block up the harbour when they have established their *dépôts*; so that in a short time
their

their troops must perish. It is not enough that they debark an army, it must be continually supplied and protected from France, otherwise, however numerous, it cannot make any progress or penetrate into the country.

If, contrary to our hopes and expectations, the British fleet is beat and drove into some harbour, and the enemy does land a powerful army, we must not despond, nor by groundless fears facilitate the success of the invaders: a just and entire confidence in government is necessary to our preservation, and the common danger should produce an union of all parties in the defence of their country. It is needless to trace the causes which have brought our affairs to this crisis; such a task would only lead to sordid division and discontent, when concord and harmony are most required. But I would beg leave to recommend to the stockholders not to be alarmed, and let their fears prevail over their reason. If

to secure their property, they draw on their bankers, and attempt at once to realize their securities, they will infallibly bring ruin and destruction on themselves and families. For though there be a sufficient sum to answer every purpose of trade and circulation, as well as to pay the interest allowed on such securities, successively as it becomes due, yet is there not in this, nor in any other country, money enough to pay off all the principals, and if it is attempted, a bankruptcy must ensue; the monied men are ruined, and the whole nation is thrown into a convulsion, which may prove incurable, particularly if the enemy is in the country. Whereas if they remain quiet, and repose a proper confidence in Government, we shall, no doubt, be able to repel the danger which threatens us. The resources of this country are numerous, they are great, and when properly exerted, will enable us to overcome our enemies, however formidable,

dable, and force them to lay down their arms.

Though the frontier of a country, as is that of England, may be very extensive, and therefore seems very difficult to be defended; yet upon a due examination, it will be always found, that such a frontier can be attacked only in few points, and that these points are fixed and determined by the nature and position of the countries at war. An army, like a traveller, must necessarily depart from a given point, and proceed to a given point in the enemy's country. The line which unites these points, I call *the Line of Operation*. It is manifest that all deviation from this, and all delays in pursuing the march, are so much time lost; and in the end, will force an enemy to return either for want of subsistence, or by bad weather, &c. To diminish the difficulties which oppose the progress of the main army on the Line of Operation, sometimes a corps is made

to act on another line to create a diversion; but such a corps can never produce a solid advantage, if you attend to the main point, and frustrate the designs of the principal army.

When the frontiers of the contending powers are contiguous, the magazines formed in the country which attacks may for some time supply the invading army; until by a victory it is enabled to take some capital fortress, and secure a tract of the enemy's country sufficient to form a new *dépôt* to support the whole, or a great part of the troops, during the winter. If this cannot be executed, it is evident the attacking army must, after a fruitless campaign, return to its own country. In proportion as an army advances into the enemy's country, new *dépôts* must be continually formed, and these as near as possible; for when they are at any considerable distance, the convoys arrive slow, require strong escorts, and are so precarious, that

that the army can neither move nor act, especially if the country is close and the defending enemy active: let him give his whole attention to attack the invading army's communications, and he must live day and night on their Line of Operation. In general, commanders mistake the principles of a defensive war, and very absurdly endeavour to check and stop the progress of an enemy, by opposing him in front in some advantageous post, which method is, for the most part, ineffectual or dangerous. You are often forced to a general action, whose consequences may be fatal, as victory will enable your adversary to fix himself in some part of the country, from whence, the ensuing campaign, he begins his operations sooner, and with additional advantages. This cannot be done if you avoid a general action, and employ the greatest part of your forces on his Line of operation, which is the only effectual and sure means to stop his progress; let him advance in front, the
length

length of his line will weaken it, and offer your attacks certain and decisive success.

If the frontiers are not contiguous, and be separated by the territories of other Princes, by forests, deserts, mountains, and above all by the sea; it is clear, that so many difficulties will occur in such an undertaking, as that of an invasion, that it is almost impossible it should succeed.

An army which acts over a branch of the sea, must occupy some convenient and safe harbour; gain a great and decisive battle, or by skilful manœuvres force the enemy to abandon such a tract of country as will, in a great measure, support the assailant; for if he depends in the smallest degree on shipping, and a precarious navigation for supplies, he cannot prosecute any solid operation, and successive campaigns will be consumed in fruitless and unmeaning excursions;
troops

troops must, however, return to the shore to take up their winter quarters, and at last his men and money being exhausted, he perishes totally, or abandons the enterprize with loss and ignominy.

From hence it appears, that an offensive war must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour and activity; for nothing less than compleat victories can render it successful. . . Consequently a defensive war must be carried on with caution and prudence, and above all things, a general action is to be avoided. You oppose the enemy in front by occupying strong posts, and with the remainder of your forces you act on his flanks and rear; which in a short time will reduce him, though much stronger, to fall back and approach his *dépôts*. If King Harold had followed this doctrine, it is probable we should have known William the Conqueror by his defeat only.

Let us now apply the principles established above to the present case.

It is evident that *Brest* is the point from whence the French must depart; because all their operations, even when they have landed, are connected with and depend upon their fleet. But as all operations which depend on navigation, are, from its nature, precarious, and liable to a thousand difficulties, they must have likewise a place of arms in this country, a spacious harbour, as near their own coast as possible, &c. and besides these advantages, absolutely required, the place must be so situated that by marching a few miles inland, they can occupy such a post as will render them masters of a tract of country behind their army sufficient to supply it with subsistence on their stops; without which, no progress can be made, nor can they remain for any considerable time in any part of the country. The plan
which

which offers these advantages, is the most eligible of any they can fix upon.

Plymouth answers perfectly this description. It is a safe and convenient harbour, near the coast of France; and by marching only to Chudleigh, the invaders will be masters of Cornwall, Devonshire, and part of Somersetshire, where they can find provisions in abundance; which will enable them to prosecute their operations, and penetrate further into the country, or if they chuse to remain there, it would be a difficult matter to drive them back, as they would have a fleet at Plymouth; and our trade being once destroyed, we must conclude a peace on the terms they chuse to impose upon us. I am happy to find that such measures have been taken by Government for the defence of that very important place, as leave us no room to fear for it.

When a *coup de main* only is intended, you must debark as near the

object you have in view as possible, because the success depends on secrecy and surprize: but when you propose to wage war in a country, you are to land your troops at a distance, that you may have time to bring your stores on shore, fortify a camp, take some capital position, and then proceed gradually towards the point you have in view. General O'Reilly, in his expedition against Algier, adopted another mode, and failed in the enterprize; he lost great part of his army, and his reputation as an officer.

Next to *Plymouth*, the only place which can serve the purpose of the enemy, is *Portsmouth*. It has two fine roads, St. Helen and Spithead, and a very safe harbour. The town and the dock on the land side are fortified, and cannot be taken without a regular siege, the undertaking of which is very difficult, though we had no ships to defend it. The island of Portsea lies very low, and does not furnish the
neces-

necessary materials to carry on the works,
 required on such occasions. The enemy
 must occupy Gosport with part of his
 army, while the remainder carries on the
 siege, and if we are masters of Portsdown,
 and can confine him to the island, we
 are always able to succour the place, and
 force him to retire, which he would find
 no easy matter. The lines of Gosport
 are of no use, and those towards Ports-
 down are against us, if the invader is in
 the island, being calculated only to stop
 an enemy coming from Portsdown, which
 I presume he never will be permitted to
 occupy. The lines of Gosport are
 equally imperfect, a good fort should be
 raised on a rising ground, a few hundred
 yards off, which would render it impos-
 sible for the enemy to attempt any thing
 on that side. In case he should ever land
 in the island of Portsea, a few redoubts
 must also be added before the front of the
 works which cover the dock, to prevent
 his approaching near enough to throw
 shells into the dock, which he might now
 do,

do, as these works are not advanced far enough into the country; an unreasonable respect for private property having occasioned their being kept so far back.

When I considered at first the position of the *Isle of Wight*, I thought that an enemy might occupy it, and with fifteen or twenty thousand men keep possession of the whole ground; but having lately examined it with proper attention, I believe now that it is absolutely impossible. This island runs from East to West, and is generally intersected with very high mountains, whose basis run quite to the shore. On the South side of the island they rise by ranges, like an amphitheatre, almost perpendicular, forty or fifty feet high, and the summits, excepting in a very few places, to above a thousand; so that if any troops are posted on them, there is no possibility of landing. The only place where it is less difficult is in Brading Bay, opposite St. Helen's Road. This is a small creek
between

between two very high hills, which being occupied, will prevent a landing. On the South side is a bay, where the shore is low, and very proper for debarking troops; but Sandown Fort defends that bay very well. From thence to the Westernmost point and the Needles, no place is found where a landing can be attempted if there is the least opposition: Besides, the coast is so open and dangerous, that a boat, much less a fleet, cannot lay at anchor an hour without the utmost risk of perishing. From the Needles to Ride you may land any where, and a fleet may anchor in safety, there being a sufficient depth of water for men of war to come through the Needles, and all the way up to Spithead. The channel between the *Needles* and *Hurst Castle* is narrow, but it is safe for the largest vessels. The Castle does not seem sufficiently strong against ships of force; but if two considerable batteries were erected on the two points which project into the sea opposite the fortress,

F

I believe

I believe that pass would be perfectly secured.

Though the difficulties which occur in landing on the South side of the Isle of Wight, and indeed of approaching it, seem insurmountable, yet if no opposition is made, it might be effected; however, if we consider the extent of the island, the great number of very high mountains, and of places to land from our side, it will appear that twenty thousand men would not be able to occupy it in such a manner as to prevent our taking it from them. They must fortify all the shore opposite the New Forest, as well as all the downs or mountains behind them; for there is no one spot on the whole island where the most extensive fortress could, in any degree, secure the possession of it to the French. If it is placed on the South shore, there is neither bay nor harbour; and by our occupying some neighbouring mountains, the garrison would be starved in it.

The

The same difficulty will occur if placed in the centre, or on the Northern shore, at Cowes, Yarmouth, &c. from whence I conclude, that while England exists as a nation, an enemy cannot keep the Isle of Wight a month, though there were thirty thousand men in it.

From *Portsmouth* to *Harwich* there is no harbour or road which can, in any degree, answer the purposes of an enemy, who intends to land a considerable army, and make war in the country. The difficulty, though very great, does not consist in debarking forty thousand men; it is also necessary, as I have already demonstrated, that they should have a commodious and safe harbour, a place of arms, and be so situated as to keep a sure and easy communication with France, especially with Brest. Such a place is not to be found on the whole coast, except Plymouth, and Portsmouth, of which enough has been said already. The Dutch fleet, they say,

came up the river very well; but how long did they remain there? A few hours only. Consider, besides, the great difference there is between coming from the coast of Holland with twenty men of war, to make a ridiculous bravado, which lasted twenty-four hours, or coming from Brest with a fleet, and four or five hundred transports to invade us, and to carry on a war into the heart of our country. The one is easy, the other impracticable.

Though I am convinced such an attempt neither will nor can be made in Suffex, Kent, or higher up; I do not think it impossible, that in order to facilitate the operations of their main army, the enemies may threaten different and distant parts of the coast; but no solid operation can, in my opinion, be executed but in the West.

Upon this supposition, it appears that our troops are too much scattered, and
cannot

cannot be brought together without a great loss of time, wherever they may land.

Whenever a tract of country is to be defended, reason points out the necessity of occupying some *central positions*, with strong corps to the right and left, to stop the enemy till the whole can be collected. *The Line we have to defend extends from Plymouth to Dover. Portsmouth* is the central point in that line, I would therefore recommend, that a third part of our army be placed there and in the New Forest; another third on *Hall Down Hill*, beyond Exeter; and the remaining third *in the limits between Sussex and Kent*, on that branch of the river Medway, called the Teise. If an attempt is made to the Westward, the body encamped at Portsmouth will march thither, and join that on Hall Down, which I suppose instantly in motion where the invasion is attempted. The body placed in *Sussex* may remain there, and by a

movement to the right or left, be any where, as occasion may require, and easily repulse every attempt made on that coast.

Should the enemy land at Plymouth, which I think most probable, for the reasons already assigned, the regiments now there will be able to dispute the ground, until those on Hall Down can come to their assistance; and it does not require twenty-four hours march. Opposed in front by the corps at Plymouth, which is covered by the works now raising there, as well as by the natural strength of the country, and attacked in the rear by the troops coming from Hall Down, an enemy, though far superior in number, would find himself greatly embarrassed. Surrounded by the sea, by strong forts, and a stronger country, occupied by fifteen or twenty thousand men, without ground sufficiently extensive to form a line, I do not conceive it possible how he could avoid a total overthrow.

There

There is not a spot about Plymouth, if properly occupied, and protected by the most inconsiderable works, but will require a siege to force you, which cannot be undertaken while you have any body of troops in the neighbourhood.

The same difficulties, and much greater, will occur to an enemy in the island of Portsea; he can neither subsist there, nor from the adjacent country, if we have a camp on Portsdown, and another in the New Forest.

From what we have said, it seems evident that no invasion can take place, until our fleet, intirely drove out of the sea, is forced to hide itself for a considerable time in some harbour; and that such an invasion cannot be prosecuted with any probability of success, unless the enemy is master of Plymouth or Portsmouth. Let us now proceed to examine the consequences, in case such an event should happen.

Supposing the enemy is in possession of Plymouth, he cannot remain there for ever; he will, in a short time, be forced to penetrate further into the country, in order to procure supplies of provision, or abandon his post for want of them. To remain there with any safety, he must occupy and fortify Mount Edgcumbe, and the ground behind the King's Brewhouse, as well as all the ground between the Tamar and that branch of the sea which runs under Mr. Parker's garden to the bridge at the three mile stone, coming to London; he should moreover have a body of troops in Mr. Parker's ground. Forty or fifty thousand men would not be sufficient for the purpose, because these being separated from the sea and the Tamar, could not, in case of an attack, support each other; and if one only of them is defeated, the others must fall successively, and in a very short time. The greatest part of the invader's army will naturally be posted between the Tamar

mar and the sea, by the bridge above mentioned, which puts the Docks, Store-house, and Plymouth behind them; this distance is near five miles, and requires twenty thousand men to defend it, which they cannot easily do, for the ground rises gradually from the shore to Dartmoor, so that you have every possible advantage in attacking their posts. The most sure method, however, would be to attack the corps placed at Mount Edgecumbe, which being beat, the others must be destroyed. Mount Edgecumbe is the key of Plymouth, and must be kept with care.

Though the enemies are in possession of all the different posts above mentioned, and have thereby a place of arms, and a fine harbour for their fleet, with which, for a time, they may put an intire stop to all our trade and navigation, yet it can only be for a time. The *combined fleet* cannot always remain there, and the army consisting of fifty or sixty thousand men,

men, cooped up in such narrow limits, cannot subsist by the supplies brought from France. They must therefore advance into the country or abandon it. The only decisive operation they could execute would be, to leave ten thousand men at Plymouth, and with the remainder proceed directly to Hall Down, between Chudleigh and Exeter, which is about thirty-six miles from Plymouth. This position is very strong, whether it is taken with the front towards Exeter, or towards Plymouth. There is no passing between the enemy's right, and the sea; and by an easy movement on the left, he is in the mountains, through which all the western roads must pass towards Cornwall. By taking this position, the enemy would be master of Devonshire and Cornwall, which would furnish subsistence in abundance, and having Teignmouth, Torbay, and Dartmouth very near, he would also receive from France whatever he wanted. Possessed of these advantages, and having a very strong country

country easily to be defended, it would become difficult to drive him back; and while his fleet, destroying our trade, rode triumphant at sea, we should be reduced to accept of any peace he chused to dictate. It is therefore incumbent upon us to post ourselves so, that we may be near enough to prevent an invading army from penetrating into the country, if we cannot hinder it from taking Plymouth. The means and method of doing this (of confining him to the shore) depending chiefly on the nature of the country, I shall therefore give a description of it, so far as it relates to military operations.

All countries are either *open* or *close*. By an *open* country, I mean that where an army, or a considerable body of troops, can almost any where find sufficient room to form in, and to act; consequently, by a *close* country, I mean that where an army, in the course of many miles, cannot find room to form and act in. By the word *defile*, I mean a narrow

narrow pass formed by mountains, hills, forests, rivers, morasses, hedges, &c. where the road is so contracted, that few men only can advance in front. In the first species of country, it is evident, that superior numbers must prevail, if the troops are equal in goodness, and the commander knows how to avail himself of that superiority; for this plain reason, that he can bring a greater number of men into action at any given time, and at any given point, than his adversary. Whereas in a close country, number is nothing, and disposition is every thing. In such a country, points only can be attacked, and by a given number of men only. So that if you occupy these points, though otherwise much inferior to the enemy, you may bring more men into action than he, and consequently prevail: besides, these points may be such as to enable you to attack him in front, flank and rear at the same time.

England,

England, in general, is of this last kind; the western country is not only very hilly, but also for the most part full of inclosures. As you come from Exeter towards London, it is so inclosed with hedges and ditches, that for many miles together, you do not find ground sufficiently open to form twenty battalions upon; so that the high road, where an army can alone march, is one continued pass, or defile, winding at the foot of the mountains, or through the inclosures, of which you may see the specimen in Plate II. Those mountains and hedges, being properly occupied, an enemy cannot advance a step; and if he is once engaged in them, he can never extricate himself out of the narrow labyrinth, and will be forced to lay down his arms.

There are two roads, which may be called military roads, from Plymouth to Exeter; the one passes by Ivy Bridge, Chudleigh and Ashburton. The other by Ivy Bridge, Totness, Newton Bushe, and over Hall
Down

Down Hill to Exeter. On the first road there are but two places, viz. Hall Down, four miles beyond Exeter, and a heath two miles beyond Chudleigh, where any considerable body of men can form upon. The remainder of the road is one continued defile, intersected by mountains, rivers, hedges and numberless rivulets, besides the Teign and the Dart, which come from Dartmoor, and fall into the sea. Though these are not very deep, yet being near the mountains, they are very rapid, and when the rain falls (which is frequent in the West) become very dangerous torrents; their beds are full of large stones, and the banks high, so that you can get over them only at the bridges, where the high road passes. The whole country between this road and the sea coast, from Exmouth to Plymouth, is exactly the same, that an army can march but in *one column*. If to avoid the difficulties and dangers which arise from such a disposition, the enemy should separate his

his forces, and advance in two columns, along the two roads above mentioned; there being no communication by means of cross roads, you may attack either or both columns separately, for they cannot support each other until they come to Hall Down: nor in all that tract of country is there a single spot where you may not attack the enemy in front, flank and rear, since the road is continually winding round the foot of the hills.

Between the Teign and the Dart the ground is rather more hilly, and more easily defended. There is but one narrow road, which goes from Dartmouth to Newton Bushel, near which the tide flows. A few miles from Dartmouth, a branch of it turns off to Totness, and several paths from towns on the coast, as Torbay, Paygnton, &c. come into the main road, leading to Hall Down or to Plymouth. However, a body of men landing between
Dartmouth

Dartmouth and Teignmouth, must finally pass through Newton Bushel in their way to Exeter, or through Totness going to Plymouth. There goes likewise from Dartmouth to Plymouth a road over the mountains, by Modbury. All these roads are equally difficult, insomuch that no wheel carriages are used by the farmers, who carry in their harvest on horses. The only proper places between Plymouth and Exmouth where ships can approach, are Dartmouth and Teignmouth; but as the entrance is very narrow, and entirely commanded by mountains, a few battalions would easily prevent a landing.

From Teignmouth, towards Exeter, there runs a very high mountain called Hall Down or Haldon Hill, already mentioned. The top is a fine plain, where a numerous army might camp and act. All the roads, as I have said, to and from the West, pass over it; but an army
can

can come upon it only by the two roads, leading from Newton Bushel and Exmouth, both very difficult. On the south side towards the Teign and Newton Bushel, the hill is rapid. On the west side it falls gradually, and forms many small hills, whose basis form very deep ravins: these hills project quite into the sea, which does not admit of any convenient place for landing troops, and is moreover so shallow that no ships of burthen can approach the shore. Upon the whole, the country from Exeter to Plymouth is so extremely close and difficult, that a few men, properly disposed, will stop, and ruin a numerous army.

From Exeter, where most of the western roads join, there are but two roads towards Salisbury, which may be practicable for an army; to Axminster there is only one. At this place begin the two, one to the left through Yeovil, Sherborne, Shaftesbury, and over the
 G Downs;

Downs; the other to the right by Bridport, Dorchester and Blandford, to Salisbury. The first road as far as Shaftesbury is intersected by numberless hills and vallies, extremely close and cultivated, so that an army can march only in one column. There is scarce a spot where you cannot occupy some post across the road to prevent an enemy from advancing, while the hedges on both sides, lined with your infantry, would so embarrass him, that he could neither advance or retire, or indeed make any defence on the ground for want of room to form a line. From Shaftesbury to Salisbury the road passes over a narrow down, having on one side a high ridge of mountains, which runs towards Blandford, and Cranbourn chace, and on the other a deep and wide valley very close. This down is also cut by a great number of ravins, so that very often there is not room to form a single battalion. If the ridge of mountains, and the valley are occupied, no army can proceed

proceed on the high road; nor can it be separated into several columns, without exposing them to be beat in detail, as from the nature of the ground they cannot support each other. The road which goes by Bridport is extremely difficult till you are about two miles beyond that place; then the country opening as far as Salisbury, becomes less inclosed, and offers every where ground sufficient to form a numerous army upon, and very proper for a general action, if you are superior in cavalry.

From Salisbury two roads go towards London: the first by Andover, Basingstoke, Bagshot, Egham, Staines, &c. Near the seven mile stone a branch goes by Stockbridge over some very high hills, and joins it at Basingstoke: this branch passes through an open country, which however being very high, offers many excellent camps. The first is also carried for some miles through an open country;

country; but about Andover, and from thence to Basingstoke, and Hartford-bridge, it is very close. The other road goes by Rumsey, Farnham, &c. through a country which is still more close than the former, and in proportion affords greater advantages in attacking the enemy.

It is needless to prosecute this description any further, because I am persuaded, that no army, however numerous, will ever be able to penetrate forty miles into the country, if proper methods are taken to oppose it, and if we know how to avail ourselves of the numberless resources which may be drawn from the face of the country. And I have no doubt, from the known experience, firmness, and abilities of the commander in chief*, but that the event, should an invasion take place, will justify the high trust that his Majesty has placed in him, and fully answer the expectations of the public.

* Lord Amherst.

The description I have given is exceedingly imperfect, as no map, plan, or drawing, can convey a true military, and adequate idea of any country. The eye alone, and a good one, accustomed to view ground on a grand scale, very different from that of a parade, can do it effectually. I think, however, that what I have said, if read with attention, accompanied with the Map annexed, (*Plate 1.*) will shew the lines on which the enemy can act, as well as the advantages or disadvantages of the country, through which such lines must necessarily pass. The commander in chief, and his officers, upon examining the ground, will easily fix the particular *points* where to act, while these points, and the *motions* of the enemy will shew *how* to act, as circumstances may require.

CHÂP. V.

Observations on the method of ranging the Troops, and of making War, &c. and additional detail of the Invaders difficulties.

THE French army has, no doubt, some advantages over ours at present (the veteran regiments being almost all in America): it is composed of old corps, which have been accustomed to exercise and discipline for many years: the officers of the higher ranks have seen service, and many of them have commanded separate corps during the last war. The habit of being united for a long time *together*, gives them a facility in manœuvring, a consistency and adherence of parts, if I may so call it, not so easily broke as in new levies; all which must insure them a great superiority in a plain and open country, and in a
general

general action. In a close country, where the combat is partial, and confined to particular posts, valour and a good disposition will supply, in a great measure, the defects inherent to new corps.

Though in point of discipline, our enemies, at present, enjoy some advantages over us, we possess so many over them, in every other respect, that, if we avail ourselves of them, there can be no room left to fear the event of the invasion, with which we are now threatened.

1st, The face of the country forces them to march in one column; and this difficulty alone overbalances almost every other advantage.

2dly, They have but little cavalry, which, from the nature of the country, may not, if we chuse it, ever have an opportunity of acting.

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3dly, They can have no heavy artillery, and not many field pieces, compared to what we can bring into the field.

4thly, They can have no other provisions but what they bring with them, which, however abundant it may seem, will last only for a very short time.

5thly, They can never have a sufficient number of horses and carriages to transport their stores, artillery, baggage, provisions, &c. which will retard their march, so that they cannot advance above a mile or two in one day.

6thly, When they proceed from the shore, they can form no magazines in the country, and must be supplied from their original *dépôt*; and when their line of communication is protracted to a certain length, half their army will not be sufficient to escort their convoys, which you may, and must intercept. This will not only retard their progress,

gress, but very soon stop them entirely. and force their army to go back. They have but this alternative, to gain a great and decisive victory, or abandon the enterprize. They cannot remain on the spot, in a close country, surrounded by mountains on every side, and those occupied by our troops : and we have nothing to do but to profit of these advantages, and avoid a general action.

7thly, They cannot send detachments, or deviate from the great road, without being exposed to certain destruction : whereas we, availing ourselves of every cross road and path, can without risk attack their whole line of march, and soon throw it into confusion. They can act on that only ; whereas we can act where, and when we please.

To these natural advantages we may, I think, procure others from a different manner of ranging the troops, and of carrying on the war.

The

The present mode of ranging the infantry three men deep, armed with muskets only, is subject to many and very great defects.

First, The line becomes too extensive, and is therefore weak ; it cannot advance in any ground, particularly in a close one, without the greatest difficulties and delays, contrary to the very principle of military operations, which should be as quick as lightning.

Secondly, It is inadequate to almost every purpose of war, as well against infantry as cavalry, and proper only for fighting at a distance. If you approach the enemy, the line is too weak, the arms too short for a shock, and veteran troops will have a decisive superiority. Placed behind entrenchments, hedges, ditches, &c. which naturally offer great advantages, you can make no resistance from the moment the enemy attacks them, so that unless you keep him off by

by your fire, he penetrates somewhere, and you must abandon the whole, or be taken in flank, and cut to pieces,

To remedy these defects, I humbly propose, that the infantry be ranged four deep, and that the fourth rank be armed with a Pike eleven or twelve feet long, two feet of which must be made of steel, two inches broad, to cut on each side, without any hatchet, or cross bar, that it may easily pass ~~the~~ the hedges. This fourth rank ~~must be~~ composed of the tallest and strongest men.

This formation will render the line less extensive, stronger, and much more active, is proper for every operation, and particularly adapted to our country, every where inclosed with hedges and ditches. In a plain, no infantry formed in the usual manner can resist its shocks an instant, or even approach your line, much less if this is placed behind an entrenchment, or hedge. Moreover, if
4 you

you form a battalion or two into squares, protected by some howitzers on the flanks, no cavalry, however brave, can overturn them. The three first ranks protected by a row of Pikes, which project before them at least five feet, will feel the advantage, and soon find their superiority in whatever ground they are attacked, as well as in attacking the enemy :—(*Plate 3.*)—Let an experiment be made, the event will shew the superiority of the method I propose over that now in practice. It is a novelty. Very true; and this novelty will not a little disconcert the enemy.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Order of Battle.

THE order of battle now adopted in Europe is, in many respects, defective and absurd. The infantry and cavalry formed three deep make the line so very extensive, that it loses all its activity, which is the soul of military manœuvres, and alone can insure success : insomuch that it may be established as an axiom, that the army which moves and marches with the greatest velocity, must, from that circumstance alone, finally prevail. Our military institutions exclude every idea of celerity ; hence it is that our victories are never compleat and decisive, and that our attacks are reduced to some particular points, which gained or lost, the battle is over ; the enemy retires generally

generally in good order, because from the extent and slowness of our motions we cannot pursue him with any vigour; he occupies some neighbouring hill, and we have to begin again. Moreover, the position of the cavalry in a line on the flanks of the infantry, is such that it retards the motions of the whole, because none can advance unless the whole line does; besides, it cannot from its situation there support the infantry, or be supported by it: the moment is lost before you can bring the cavalry where it is wanted. The reason assigned for placing the cavalry on the flanks is absurd, *viz.* to cover the flanks of the infantry.—Pray, is not the flank of the cavalry much weaker than that of the infantry? since it cannot in any manner form a flank to protect itself, much less will it protect the flank of the infantry. Three or four battalions, armed with Pikes, and formed into oblong squares, are the only flanks which can effectually cover the line against infantry or cavalry, and

and they must have, besides field-pieces, ten or twelve twelve-pounders, and a few howitzers. (*Plate 3.*)

Cavalry must never appear but in the moment it is brought to action, action being the very essence of the cavalry. When the ground, or other circumstances, do not permit you to bring it to action, it must be kept back behind the infantry, whose flanks, secured as I propose, have nothing to fear. If you think your line too weak, though it is much stronger than any other formed in the usual way, let every third or fourth battalion in the line be formed into squares, as those in the flanks, and be assured nothing can resist their efforts, much less overturn and break the line.

In the manner our line is now formed, not a third of the army is engaged, and that successively; so that numbers are of no use, and only serve to retard its motions, and increase the expence. To remedy

medy these defects I would humbly propose, that all the infantry be formed in such a manner, that between each battalion, or regiment, an interval of one hundred and fifty yards be left; behind these intervals I would have the cavalry placed in two lines at a proper distance, each squadron separately, with intervals to manœuvre upon. (*Plate*)

The first advantage resulting from this disposition is, that you may extend your line to any length, without any danger. The second, that you bring the whole into action at once, and though the enemy be double the number, you may out-flank him, and are in reality stronger than him, for you attack his whole front with superior forces. The third, that the motions of the whole line are more rapid, as each regiment or battalion moves and acts by itself; and though some may be more advanced than others, no inconvenience can arise from it, because if the enemy is imprudent

prudent enough to break his line to attack such advanced battalion, upon the right and left, he will find others formed into squares to take him on both flanks; and if he advances a certain length out of his line, you order your battalion to stop, or even retire *à la débandade*, and in that instant you order some of your squadrons to move forwards through the intervals full gallop, and to charge pell-mell; as one horseman acting in this manner has more real activity than seventy who advance and attack in a line as usual. I saw once three hundred horse attack a column of seven or eight thousand foot in this way, which they defeated and dispersed in three or four minutes. The fourth advantage is, that if your line is broke in some places, the enemy cannot avail himself of the disorder, because your cavalry advances, and gives the infantry time to recover. The fifth, that if your infantry breaks that of the enemy in any point, then advance your first line of cavalry to attack and disperse it, the

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whole

whole moving forwards rapidly at the same time, which will infallibly produce a general slaughter, and your victory is complete and decisive. The last advantage of this order of battle which I shall mention is, that it is *general, and equally adapted to every species of country*, when an army can act in the least. In an open country you combine the action of cavalry with that of the infantry, and heavy artillery. In a close country, where an extensive line cannot be formed, the original formation of the troops enables you to act separately, as the ground may require, by corps, detachments, brigades, or regiments, and that always with superior vigour and activity. *It is peculiarly adapted to our country*; I hope, therefore, it will be received and applied on the present occasion.

C H A P. VII.

Of the general Method of making War.

OUR armies, however numerous, are united in one body formed in two or three lines. Between this army and that of the enemy, at a certain distance, the light troops, very often amounting to twenty thousand men, form another army, which is called a chain to observe the enemy, prevent his coming upon you unawares, and cover the march of the grand army. Sometimes also detachments of them are sent to escort your convoys, or to cover a certain district, while the army acts on another line. These light troops, though very numerous, they consider only as mere scouts to observe the enemy, insomuch that on a day of battle they are not to be found, and seldom or ever take part in the

action. Whether you advance to the enemy, or the enemy comes to you, the light troops disperse to the right and left, and you hear no more of them till the next day. Why on such occasions they do not form on the right and left of the army, at a convenient distance, and attack the enemy on the flanks, is to me as inconceivable as the use now made of them appears ridiculous and absurd. Four or five hundred men, including one hundred hussars, distributed into small parties in the woods, behind the hedges, near the high roads, would observe the enemy much better than ten thousand men. The motions of such a body as that of an army of light troops, are too slow, and always before the eyes of the enemy, so that he can mark them, and make some capital manœuvres without your knowledge. Whereas a chain of small parties going every where, unite or disperse in a moment, and are always invisible, so that it is impossible for the enemy to make any kind of movement

ment without your having timely notice.

The great defect of the present method of acting is, that however numerous your army may be, if it is formed in one body, your motions are extremely slow. Secondly, the enemy may direct his march so that he outflanks you. Thirdly, you must have a great body of troops between you and him to watch his motions. Fourthly and finally, by marching against him in a line whose direction is perpendicular to his front, you cannot outflank him. To remedy these very capital defects, I would beg leave to propose another mode of distributing the troops of which our army is composed.

In order to explain what I have to say on this subject, I must premise, First, that a man or body of men, as an army, can defend themselves only in front; consequently, if you can attack them on

either, or both flanks, you will easily beat them, and much more so if you come upon them in the rear. Hence it is that Nature points out the danger, and raises that *panic* with which an army is seized when the men apprehend that they are attacked in the rear; conscious of their weakness, they generally fly in confusion. Sometimes the face of the country obliges an enemy to contract his front, as when he comes upon you in columns: then the moment is favourable to attack him, before he has time to form his line. Sometimes by your throwing up some Redoubts before your front, (*Plate 3.*) he is obliged to break his line, and to advance in columns: this likewise is an occasion to attack him with advantage. Both are, however, too generally neglected. Men, for the most part, fix on a given spot to fight, which they will not quit, though the enemy in his progress gives many opportunities to a successful attack. They make their arrangements on paper, and
by

by the slowness of their movements abide by them, being utterly unable to form and execute new dispositions, as circumstances may require.

Besides the circumstances just mentioned, which *force an enemy* to contract his front, there is a method of extending yours, so that you may always out-flank him, though he be much superior in number. If you can *form on a portion of a circle*, whose branches project beyond his flanks, and the enemy persists in advancing within that circle, or remains in a line as usual, while you extend yours in a curve, so that you come on either, or both his flanks, it is evident that if you attack him in that disposition, he must be beat (*Plate 3.*) I therefore propose that your army be divided always in five parts, three placed in the centre, one fifth on the right, the remaining fifth on the left, and each advanced more or less, as the nature of the ground permits. They must

must not be behind the enemy, and liable to be cut off, as happened to the Prussians at Maxen, unless the whole of your army is opposed to the enemy's flank; then indeed you may place one or both corps nearly behind him, if the ground is advantageous. They must, however, wherever posted, have some certain and secure retreat, otherwise you expose them to great risk, and perhaps to utter ruin and destruction.

The advantages arising from this distribution of the troops are many. First, In whatever ground you act it is equally applicable. Secondly, The motions of the whole army are more simple and quicker. Thirdly, The enemy can make no manœuvres without your knowledge. Fourthly, Whether he advances to the right or left, (for he cannot, without exposing his army to the most imminent danger, advance against your centre,) your corps which he is attacking may fall back, or be supported by the centre, while the other attacks the flank opposite to

to it. If the enemy keeps his ground and waits your attack, then you act against both his flanks at the same time; or by lengthening your line to the right or left, enclose his flank while you attack his front. In short, while you can force him to attack within a portion of a circle, the victory is yours. This method, I repeat it, is general, equally proper for all cases; but more particularly advantageous, and even necessary for a defensive war,

Every army acts upon two lines, that on which it stands, and that which is drawn from the post it occupies, to the province it means to cover, or the places from whence it draws its subsistences. An army acting offensively, departs from a given point where its *dépôts* are lodged, and goes to a given point in the enemy's country. It is often and indeed generally adviseable for those on the defensive to avoid a battle; because the consequences are, or may be fatal. But it does not follow that you are to remain inactive:

inactive : what is then to be done ? The answer is obvious. The centre must occupy some advantageous post, strongly fortified, while the two corps or wings must act day and night on the enemy's line of operation. If this is executed with vigour, he will soon be reduced to the necessity of attacking your centre, which you may avoid, by taking a new position, and gain time or wait for it, while the two wings attack his flanks during the action ; or else he must fall back to be nearer his *dépôts*, or finally send strong corps against yours ; and as these retire not on your army, he loses his time and labour. By this disposition of your troops you cover your country effectually, and prevent the enemy from advancing towards your centre. The further he advances the more danger he runs ; for his line of operation will be the longer and the less easy to be guarded. If, on the contrary, you act offensively, the enemy may find a thousand strong camps, from whence

whence you cannot force him by any attack on his front; but if you act by corps, as I propose, and direct your march on either flank, which enables you to act on his line of operation, you will in a few days force him to abandon his camp, and fight you on your own terms, or abandon the country. If he permits you to approach him, you may not only force him to abandon the country, but oblige him to retire in a given direction. I do not therefore understand a General where he says, the enemy was posted in such a manner that he could not be forced. I admit it could not perhaps be done by attacking his front; but unless his subsistence grows under his feet, he may be forced to abandon any camp, if you act on his flanks and line of operation, which he cannot prevent but by taking another position.

The march of an army is justly considered as one of the most capital operations in the art of war; I shall therefore

fore beg leave to point out the principles on which it is to be formed.

First, That it be executed in the least time possible.

Secondly, That the columns may be formed into a line with the greatest facility.

It follows from hence, that if the whole line, or lines, could march in front from one camp to another, this would be the most perfect way of marching, because no time would be lost in forming the columns for the march, or in replacing them in a line. Every officer will conceive that I mean a common march, when you advance in front towards the enemy; for if you move on his flanks, you have nothing to do but to make the army, as it stands in two or three lines, march on its right or left; then you are in order of battle, by a simple movement to the right or left, on the ground where you stand.

stand. But as no country is sufficiently open for an army to advance in a line, for any considerable distance, you must of course break that line, and march in several columns. The more numerous these columns are, the better for the reasons above-mentioned. The worst of all consequently is, that when you can march in one column only, because it supposes that the whole army is in a defile, and exposed to be cut in pieces by very few men, who occupy the ground through which such a column is passing. This must be the case with the French, if they attempt to penetrate into this country, as appears from the description we have given of it.

CONCLU.

CONCLUSION.

BESIDES the *Introduction*, the Editor has thought it necessary to supply the *Conclusion*. This the reader will perceive is equally in illustration of the main object and outline of the present Treatise. The subjects principally canvassed are the importance and the neglect of Dover and Milford Haven; the population and defence of the kingdom, as connected and contrasted with its geographical position, and with the state of Parliamentary Representation.

Dover. Nature has made the Straits of Dover the principal maritime pass and defile of Great Britain, through which the reciprocal commerce of the northern and southern nations of Europe is conveyed; and through which our principal, and I am sorry to say, hereditary

ditary foe, must transport her naval stores. Art therefore should, if possible, be employed in the assistance of nature, so as to construct a harbour capable of receiving ships of war and commerce when in danger or distress. Ships cannot, without great risk, lay in sight of Dover, that is in the Downs, during the equinoctial gales, and winter season; and therefore without a convenient and safe harbour in the vicinity, an enemy may watch opportunities to steal through unmolested. Dover seems to me a most important barrier to the Medway, and to the Thames; and a hostile debarkation on the part of France, north of Dover, might in a variety of ways be annoyed from that intermediate post. These narrow straits, a dangerous coast, and a secure harbour, would even compensate for a considerable inferiority of maritime force, both in naval action, and in laying so advantageous for the interception of naval stores. I conceive that our convicts would be far more profitably

fitably employed in such labour, and in clearing harbours, than in distant and expensive voyages to Botany Bay, where both their present and future utility is at least problematical. Dunkirk and Cherbourg are constructed at an enormous expence, notoriously, as a Scylla and Charybdis, to devour the British commerce. We are unjust to ourselves, should we neglect the means of counterbalancing and counteracting these ambuscades and overt stratagems of France.

Milford Haven. This convenient, capacious, and safe harbour, is situated on the projecting coast of Wales, in a central situation between Great Britain and Ireland, and in the middle between Bristol and Liverpool, and therefore is admirably calculated to protect and promote the whole commerce of the west coast of Britain, of the opposite coast of Ireland, and of the intermediate channel. It has many recommendations to

to render it a principal rendezvous of domestic and northern fisheries, and a nursery of seamen. It is out of the reach or easy access of any southern, and still more of any northern foe. Nature too has been bountiful in constructing it, with very little addition of art, an asylum and retreat with difficulty assailable.

I am next to speak of *Population and Parliamentary Representation*, as connected and contrasted with the geographical position, and defence of the kingdom. In what do all the French political writers principally exult in the superiority of France over Great Britain and Ireland? In population and numbers. If we search for the foundation and columns of real power and revenue, we shall find them to consist in *Agriculture, Manufactories, Commerce, Fisheries, Population*. These may be termed the five elements, or five orders of political architecture; they reciprocally as-

sist and sustain each other, and are at the same time intimately connected with all the arts and sciences, and with political freedom. On each of these comprehensive sciences a separate Professor and Lecturer should be established throughout our Universities. But upon the latter of these topics alone, population, as being deeply involved in the subject of the present treatise, I shall make a few observations. Did time permit I should have no difficulty in demonstrating that Great Britain and Ireland might, in one century only, be rendered equal in population to France, and that in a single generation our maritime strength might be trebled. The glare of an immense but oppressive revenue, and of a mighty catalogue of ships of war, must in time suffer an eclipse, should the subject of population, and likewise of emigration, continue to be treated with the same cold indifference and inattention by our Legislators and Ministers.

It

It seems never to have occurred to our orators or political writers, in their discussions and proposals for a reform of Parliamentary Representation, to combine and contrast such propositions with the invasion, defence, and strength of the kingdom. For instance; when we take a geographical survey of Great Britain, as connected with the means of defence, and with parliamentary representation, it will appear wisdom in our forefathers, that the parts most exposed to invasion, should be provided and fortified with additional population, and a stronger frontier. This, amongst others, I conceive was one reason why political privileges and prerogatives were held out to the inhabitants of the Channel coast; and why parliamentary boroughs were multiplied in the southern and most vulnerable parts of our island.

If we draw a line, across the southern base of Great Britain, from London to Bath and Bristol, and another line from

London to Harwich, we shall comprehend in these two segments of the coast, all the parts of Great Britain most subject to invasion, especially from a southern foe: we shall find also that they furnish almost one half of the representatives in the House of Commons, although their area does not amount to one-fifth of the whole island. Reasoning therefore on principles of analogy, we should infer that the lines of an entrenchment or fortification most exposed to attack should have additional strength, population, and guards. Indeed nature has, in many respects, endowed the southern segment of our island with superlative political pre-eminence. But except along the intersecting line of London, Bath, and Bristol, there are *now* no other large cities throughout the whole southern base of Great Britain. Our great manufacturing cities and towns have been gradually migrating more to the center and north of England; and

one half of our boroughs have been suffered to fall into decay;

The propositions for a parliamentary reformation, which have been offered by men of transcendent abilities, the principles of which, are an increase in the number of the representatives, and the amputation and purchase of the decayed and rotten boroughs, are both, in my opinion, liable to weighty and insuperable objections. These objections, I had arranged in detail, but find them much too voluminous for the present publication. I think it is a dubious proposition whether the parliamentary representation should bear an exact proportion to the geographical dimensions or area of the country; whether parliamentary representation should travel after the population, or "vice versa," whether the latter should not be directed and guided to accompany the representation, and to be made subservient to the political organization or skeleton of the constitution, which
time

time has rendered venerable. For example, would it not be more beneficial to the joint security of the constitution, and of the kingdom, to strengthen the Channel frontier, and principal seat of the decayed boroughs, by one or two million of additional inhabitants? Holland is a proof how population may be compelled to follow a wise legislation, even against all the disadvantages of nature and situation. Decayed boroughs may be stocked like pastures, or engrafted, like old trees, and rendered again vigorous and prolific. Would there be more difficulty or less prudence and œconomy in concentrating the strength of Great Britain, by such domestic colonization, than in founding empires, and squandering millions across the Atlantic? Are there not disbanded officers, sailors, soldiers? Some more encouragement should be dealt out to these defenders of their country. Are there not fisheries and manufactories to encourage the necessitous and industrious?

Are

Are there not an exuberance of parochial children in our overgrown and gorged metropolis, who might be maintained at less expence, and with more utility to the nation, were they dispersed throughout the counties and boroughs which skirt the Channel?

I am persuaded that the principal proprietors of decayed boroughs, together with the legislature and the nation, would be equally interested and benefited in adopting a mild and easy remedy for parliamentary reformation, that is, by colonizing all decayed boroughs with additional houses and inhabitants. Alexander the Great, during the career of war, planned and built many magnificent cities, and whilst he was adding immense empires to the Macedonian. By the simple method here suggested, the representation of our most opprobrious boroughs might soon be recruited, and raised to a decent and respectable standard. The House of Commons should

should beware of persevering against every petition, remonstrance and satire, to degrade themselves in the public estimation. It is for their own interest, and credit that one third of the popular elections should not be considered by too many of the nation as a burlesque on representation, and that they should not be made a subject of ridicule throughout Europe. If they reject the projects of political re-edification, they cannot deny the propriety and necessity of political repair. It is obvious, that by acting thus, they will likewise add to the strength, defence, and security of the island, where it is most vulnerable, and most exposed.

A political and military survey of Ireland, as connected with its invasion and defence, is earnestly recommended to those who have more leisure, and better opportunities of information, than the Editor of the present work.

F I N I S.

The MILITARY ROADS from PLYMOUTH to LONDON,
forming a junction at EXETER and at SALISBURY.

| PLYMOUTH | Dist. in Miles. | | PLYMOUTH to | Dist. in Miles. | |
|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | betw. places | from Plym. | | betw. places | from Plym. |
| To Ridgeway | 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ | | | |
| Lemin Bridge | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ | | | |
| Woodland | 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 10 | | | |
| Ivy Bridge | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Ivy Bridge to | | |
| Wrangalin | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 15 | Winton | 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 17 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Brent | 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 16 | Totness | 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 21 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Harburton | 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 19 | Newton Busbel | 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 33 |
| Dean | 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 21 $\frac{3}{4}$ | Red Lyon | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 35 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Buckford | 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 22 | HALL DOWN | 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 42 |
| Ashburton | 3 | 25 | Kenford | 2 | 44 |
| Beckington | 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 28 $\frac{1}{4}$ | Alphington | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 46 |
| Chudleigh | 5 | 33 $\frac{1}{4}$ | Exeter | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 48 |
| Stillington | 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 41 | | | |
| Exeter | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 43 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Exeter to | | |
| Honiton Clyft | 4 | 47 | Heavy Tree | 1 | 44 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Rochbere | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 49 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Bishop's Clyft | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 48 |
| Honiton Bridge | 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 56 | Newton Poplar | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 55 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Honiton | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 59 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Sidford | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 58 |
| Offwell | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 63 | Cullyford | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 65 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Axminster | 6 | 69 | Lyme | 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 72 |
| Ford | 2 | 71 | Shaderton | 2 | 74 |
| Street | 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 75 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | | |
| Crewkerne | 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 82 | Chidiok | 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 78 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Hafilbeer | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 84 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Bridport | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 81 |
| East Chirnock | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 87 | | | |
| West Coker | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 88 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Stapleton | 10 | 91 |
| Yeovil | 3 | 91 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Dorchester | 5 | 96 |
| Babylon Hill | 1 | 92 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | | |
| Sherborn | 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 97 | Piddle River | 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 100 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Milborn Port | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 99 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | | |
| Stour West-over | 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 106 | Milford | 4 | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Stour East-over | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 108 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | | |
| Shaftesbury | 4 | 112 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Blandford | 8 | 112 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Ludwell | 1 | 113 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | | |
| White Street Hill | 4 | 117 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Woodgate's Inn | 12 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 125 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Fovent Hut | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 121 | | | |
| Over the Plain by | | | Coombe | 8 | 133 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| the Race Ground | 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 126 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | | |
| Mount Harman | | | | | |
| Hill | 3 | 129 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | | |
| Salisbury to | 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 131 $\frac{1}{4}$ | Salisbury to | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 136 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| LONDON | 82 | 213 $\frac{3}{4}$ | LONDON | 82 | 218 $\frac{3}{4}$ |

MILITARY ROADS from PORTSMOUTH to LONDON; and
from DOVER to LONDON.

| | Dist. in Miles. | | | Dist. in Miles. | |
|-------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| | betw. places | from Portf. | | betw. places | from Dover |
| PORTSMOUTH to | | | DOVER to | | |
| Portsea Bridge | 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Buckland | 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ | |
| Cosham | 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 5 | Yewel Turnpike | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| PORTSDOWN | 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Lidden | 2 | 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Purbeck's Heath | 2 | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Halfway House | 3 | 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Bere Forest | 1 | 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Barham Down | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Horndean | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 11 | Bridge | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 12 |
| Petersfield | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 18 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Canterbury | 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 15 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Sheet Bridge | 1 | 19 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Harble Down | 1 | 16 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Rake | 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 23 $\frac{1}{4}$ | Bleane Hill | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 19 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Lippock | 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 26 | Bocton Street | 1 | 20 $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Over the Heath to | | | Ofspring | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 24 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Hind Head Hill | 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 31 $\frac{1}{4}$ | Green Street | 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Milford | 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Radfield Street | 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 28 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Godalming | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 39 | Rapchild | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 29 $\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Catharine Hill | 3 | 42 | Sittingbourn | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 31 |
| Guildford | 1 | 43 | Key Street | 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 33 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Ripley | 6 | 49 | Newington Street | 1 | 34 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Cobham Street | 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 53 $\frac{1}{4}$ | Raynham | 3 | 37 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Ether | 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 56 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Chatham and Ro- | | |
| Thames Ditton | 2 | 58 $\frac{1}{2}$ | chester | 3 | 40 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Kingston | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 61 | Stroud | 2 | 42 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| LONDON. | 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 73 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Gad's Hill | 2 | 44 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| | | | Chalk Street | 3 | 47 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| | | | Northfleet | 3 | 50 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| | | | Dartford | 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 55 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| | | | Crayford | 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 57 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| | | | Wellen | 3 | 60 $\frac{1}{4}$ |
| | | | Shooter's Hill and | | |
| | | | Woolwich | 3 | 63 |
| | | | Greenwich and | | |
| | | | Deptford | 3 | 66 |
| | | | LONDON | 5 | 71 $\frac{1}{4}$ |

*Sea-port Towns and Villages along the CHANNEL COAST,
between PLYMOUTH and DOVER, and between DOVER
and MARGATE, with the Distances between each, by
the Roads, &c. &c.*

| Miles. | Counties. | Towns and Villages. | Diff. in Miles. |
|------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| from
Dover | | | betw.
places from
Lond. |
| 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | Devonshire | Plymouth | 216 |
| 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Dartmouth | 30 204 |
| 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Torbay | 6 191 |
| 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ | Dorsetshire | Telghamouth | 9 183 |
| 12 | | Exmouth | 7 168 |
| 15 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Sidmouth | 9 158 |
| 16 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Lyme | 16 143 |
| 19 $\frac{3}{4}$ | | Weymouth | 24 129 |
| 20 $\frac{3}{4}$ | | Poole | 31 110 |
| 24 $\frac{1}{4}$ | Hampshire | Christ Church | 10 100 |
| 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | Lymington | 10 90 |
| 28 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Southampton | 18 76 |
| 29 $\frac{3}{4}$ | | Portsmouth | 14 73 |
| 31 | | | |
| 33 $\frac{1}{4}$ | Suffex | Chichester | 18 61 |
| 34 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Pagham | 6 67 |
| 37 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Arundel | 15 63 |
| 40 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Little Hampton | 4 65 |
| 42 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Shoreham | 15 56 |
| 44 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Brightelmstone | 7 62 |
| 47 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Rotten Dean | 4 55 |
| 50 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | New Haven | 5 56 |
| 55 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | Seaford | 4 59 |
| 57 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | East Bourne | 8 64 |
| 60 $\frac{1}{4}$ | | Pevensey | 5 60 |
| | | Hastings | 12 64 |
| 63 | | Rye | 8 63 |
| | | New Romney | 16 71 |
| 66 | | Hith | 8 63 |
| 71 $\frac{1}{2}$ | | Folkstone | 4 72 |
| | Kent | Dover | 7 71 |
| | | Deal | 10 72 |
| | | Sandwich | 5 67 |
| | | Ramsgate | 5 73 |
| | | Margate | 5 72 |

A TABLE of the Distances by Sea between PLYMOUTH and HARWICH, &c. &c.

| | Leagues. | Dist. by land
in miles
from Lond. |
|------------------|----------|---|
| From Plymouth to | | 217 |
| Portsmouth | 50 | 73 |
| Dover | 40 | 71 |
| Margate | 8 | 70 |
| Sheetness | 9 | 40 |
| Tilbury Fort | 6½ | 20 |
| Landguard Fort | 19 | 58 |

A TABLE of the Distances between Sea-ports in FRANCE to Sea-ports in GREAT-BRITAIN and IRELAND,

| | Leagues |
|-------------------------|---------|
| From Brest to Galway | 180 |
| Corke | 100 |
| Plymouth | 60 |
| Torbay | 70 |
| Portsmouth | 100 |
| The Downs | 132 |
| Cherbourg to Portsmouth | 26 |
| Dieppe to Brighton | 26 |
| Hastings | 22 |
| Calais to Dover | 7 |
| Dunkirk to Margate | 17 |
| Ramsgate | 15 |



E R R A T U M.

In Page x, line 23, of the Introduction, *for* became sacrifices to their own imprudence, *read* became a sacrifice to her own imprudence.

*In the PRESS, and will be published in
January,*

OBSERVATIONS POLITICAL and COM-
MERCIAL relative to NOOTKA SOUND; its Dis-
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
I A N E L

OF THE LINE TO DEFEND,
NORTH to DOVER.

English Miles.

GENERAL FACE OF THE COUNTRY
ON THE WESTERN ROADS,
Chiefly between Plymouth and Exeter.

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


The PIKE and the PIKEMEN

Note
The men
have been
drawn at
a greater
distance
than they
ought to be,
in order to
shew more
clearly their
respective
attitudes



The Army formed in a portion of a Circle



The Army formed in a Line, with Redoubts and Epaulements in Front, and Battalions armed with Pikes on the Flanks.

